Validation and Verification (V&V) of Safety-Critical Systems Operating Under Off-Nominal Conditions by Belcastro, Christine M.
Validation and Veriﬁcation (V&V) of
Safety-Critical Systems Operating under
Oﬀ-Nominal Conditions
Christine M. Belcastro
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
e-mail: christine.m.belcastro@nasa.gov
Summary. Loss of control (LOC) remains one of the largest contributors to air-
craft fatal accidents worldwide. Aircraft LOC accidents are highly complex in that
they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or more
often in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these
accidents. Research is underway at the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) in the development of advanced onboard system technologies for
preventing or recovering from loss of vehicle control and for assuring safe operation
under oﬀ-nominal conditions associated with aircraft LOC accidents. The transition
of these technologies into the commercial ﬂeet will require their extensive validation
and veriﬁcation (V&V) and ultimate certiﬁcation. The V&V of complex integrated
systems poses highly signiﬁcant technical challenges and is the subject of a parallel
research eﬀort at NASA. This chapter summarizes the V&V problem and presents
a proposed process that could be applied to complex integrated safety-critical sys-
tems developed for preventing aircraft LOC accidents. A summary of recent research
accomplishments in this eﬀort is referenced.
1 Introduction: Motivation for Oﬀ-Nominal Conditions
Aircraft LOC accidents can result from numerous causal and contributing fac-
tors that are collectively referred to in this chapter as “oﬀ-nominal conditions”.
“Oﬀ-nominal” conditions include adverse conditions occurring onboard the
vehicle, such as system failures, external hazards, such as inclement weather,
and abnormal ﬂight conditions, such as stall/departure. A more detailed de-
scription of oﬀ-nominal conditions associated with aircraft LOC accidents is
given in Sect. 1.1.
Current aircraft autopilot systems are primarily designed for operation un-
der nominal conditions, and sometimes disengage and return control authority
to the pilot under oﬀ-nominal conditions. Future aircraft control systems will
be expected to provide resilience under oﬀ-nominal conditions and operate as
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a component of a larger resilient ﬂight system. Control resilience will need
to be designed into future systems to provide the capability to mitigate oﬀ-
nominal conditions and provide recovery back to a stable operational mode
whenever possible. This capability will be developed as part of a holistic ap-
proach to reduce aircraft LOC accidents. The broader resilient ﬂight system
will include vehicle health management, ﬂight safety management, and reliable
crew interface management functions.
V&V becomes much more diﬃcult for safety-critical resilient systems op-
erating under oﬀ-nominal conditions. The objectives of this chapter are to ad-
dress V&V issues associated with future safety-critical resilient ﬂight systems
operating under oﬀ-nominal conditions and to propose a comprehensive V&V
research framework to address these issues. The remainder of Sect. 1 describes
aircraft loss of control in more detail (Sect. 1.1) and presents a future resilient
ﬂight system concept (Sect. 1.2). Section 2 deﬁnes the V&V problem associ-
ated with future resilient ﬂight systems, describes problem complexity and key
technical challenges, identiﬁes V&V process requirements, and summarizes a
research approach being taken at NASA. Section 3 presents a comprehensive
V&V process that can serve as an initial research framework for addressing
future integrated resilient ﬂight systems. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses the status
of this research and references a detailed summary of research accomplish-
ments made at NASA Langley. Section 5 provides a chapter summary and
some concluding remarks. The primary emphasis of this chapter is on the
validation component of V&V for advanced ﬂight control systems.
1.1 Aircraft LOC
LOC remains one of the largest worldwide contributors to aircraft fatal acci-
dents. For example, a summary of worldwide commercial jet airplane accidents
from 2000 through 2009 [1] is shown in Fig. 1. As indicated in the ﬁgure, in-
ﬂight loss of control (LOC-I) is the largest accident category for transport
aircraft weighing more than 60,000 pounds, and resulted in 20 accidents and
1,848 total fatalities. The data in Fig. 1 show the number of fatalities for ac-
cident categories deﬁned by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). A full deﬁnition
of the CAST/ICAO accident categories is provided in Table 1.
Aircraft LOC is a highly complex event. Some contributors to aircraft
LOC are denoted in Fig. 1. Although some LOC factors noted in Fig. 1 were
not determined to be primary causal factors of any accidents in this class of
vehicles (i.e., over 60,000 lbs.) during the stated time period, in general they
have been found to contribute to LOC accidents and are therefore noted for
completeness. Causal and contributing factors associated with aircraft LOC
can occur individually, but more often occur in various combinations. A de-
tailed analysis of 126 aircraft LOC accidents is presented in [2], in which worst
case combinations of LOC accident precursors, i.e., causal and contributing
factors, and their time sequences are identiﬁed. These factors, or “oﬀ-nominal
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Fig. 1. Aircraft Accident Statistics for Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 2000-2009
[1]
conditions,” can be categorized as: adverse conditions occurring onboard the
aircraft, including faults, failures, damage, crew error, etc.; external hazards
and disturbances, including icing, wind shear, wake vortices, turbulence, ter-
rain and obstacles, other aircraft, etc.; and abnormal ﬂight or upset conditions,
including unusual attitudes, stall, stall/departure, etc..
Aircraft LOC clearly involves operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions,
which motivates the use of the term “oﬀ-nominal conditions” to designate
the associated causal and contributing factors. LOC accidents occur across all
vehicle classes, from small aircraft through large transports, and conﬁguration
types, from single to multiple engines, including both jet and propeller. LOC
also occurs across all operational categories, scheduled and unscheduled, and
ﬂight phases, including takeoﬀ, cruise, and approach.
Because of the scope and complexity of aircraft LOC events, i.e., accidents
and incidents, there is no single intervention strategy for preventing them.
Improved crew training and operational procedures for oﬀ-nominal conditions
can enable improved crew response during LOC events. Advanced onboard
systems that provide resilience to oﬀ-nominal conditions can enable improved
situational awareness and vehicle response under LOC events. A holistic ap-
proach for preventing aircraft LOC accidents is presented in the next section.
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Table 1. CAST/ICAO Accident Categories
AMAN Abrupt Maneuver
ADRM Aerodrome
ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
ATM Air Traﬃc Management/Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CABIN Cabin Safety Events
CFIT Controlled Flight into or Toward Terrain
EVAC Evacuation
F-NI Fire/Smoke (Non-Impact)
F-POST Fire/Smoke (Post-Impact)
FUEL Fuel Related
GCOL Ground Collision
ICE Icing
LALT Low Altitude Operations
LOC-G Loss of Control – Ground
LOC-I Loss of Control – In ﬂight
MAC Midair/Near Midair Collision
OTHR Other
RAMP Ground Handling
RE Runway Excursion
RI-A Runway Incursion – Animal
RI-VAP Runway Incursion – Vehicle, Aircraft or Person
SEC Security Related
SCF-NP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Power Plant)
SCF-PP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Power Plant)
TURB Turbulence Encounter
USOS Undershoot/Overshoot
UNK Unknown or Undetermined
WSTRW Wind Shear or Thunderstorm
1.2 Future Advanced System Concept
Improved capabilities are needed for oﬀ-nominal conditions that enable ef-
fective crew training, enhanced situational awareness, and onboard resilience.
Underlying technologies to achieve these capabilities have been the subject
of research at NASA over the past decade, i.e., since the year 2000, within
NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). Core technology areas of research
include: 1.) dynamics modeling and simulation for oﬀ-nominal conditions;
2.) diagnostics and prognostics for detecting, identifying, and characterizing
oﬀ-nominal conditions in real time or near real time; 3.) resilient control tech-
nologies for mitigation of oﬀ-nominal conditions and vehicle recovery; and 4.)
crew interface technologies for improved situational awareness and decision
support especially under oﬀ-nominal conditions.
These core technology areas must be coordinated during both development
and operation. V&V technologies must also be developed and applied to these
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technology areas for an improved understanding of safe and unsafe regions of
operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions, and for the ultimate certiﬁcation of
these technologies.
An integrated system concept can be developed based on these technolo-
gies for preventing aircraft LOC accidents in the future. One such future
concept, called the Aircraft Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance and Failsafe
Enhancement (AIRSAFE) System, is shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Aircraft Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance and Failsafe Enhancement
(AIRSAFE) System Concept
The shading and block shapes of Fig. 2 designate the four core technology
areas just discussed. Medium shading represents vehicle health management
functions, no shading represents crew interface management functions, and
dark shading represents ﬂight safety management and resilient control func-
tions. The trapezoidal shape represents modeling and simulation functions
for oﬀ-nominal conditions. Multi-shaded blocks represent shared functions
between multiple technology areas. A detailed description of the functional
capabilities and interfaces associated with the AIRSAFE System concept is
contained in [3, 4].
The V&V of future integrated systems, such as the AIRSAFE System
concept of Fig. 2, poses numerous technical challenges. In particular, there
is no current V&V capability for complex integrated safety-critical systems
operating under oﬀ-nominal conditions. This problem is the subject of Sect. 2.
6 Christine M. Belcastro
2 V&V Problem
The V&V of integrated safety-critical systems that are designed for operation
under oﬀ-nominal conditions is a complex problem. The V&V process must
ultimately lead to system certiﬁcation. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in the United States and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in Eu-
rope have developed extensive and compatible certiﬁcation speciﬁcations. The
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) and Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR) Part
25 provides the certiﬁcation speciﬁcations for transport category aircraft, and
Section 1309 applies to equipment and systems installed onboard aircraft. An
excerpt from FAR 25.1309 is provided below, and JAR 25.1309 is nearly iden-
tical.
Part 25 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
Sec. 25.1309: Equipment, systems, and installations.
(a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this
subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions
under any foreseeable operating condition.
(b) The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in
relation to other systems, must be designed so that –
(1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued
safe ﬂight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and
(2) The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce the capa-
bility of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating
conditions is improbable.
(c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system oper-
ating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Sys-
tems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed
to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards.
(d) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section must be shown
by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate ground, ﬂight, or simulator
tests. The analysis must consider –
(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage from external
sources.
(2) The probability of multiple failures and undetected failures.
(3) The resulting eﬀects on the airplane and occupants, considering the stage of
ﬂight and operating conditions, and
(4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability of de-
tecting faults.
The terminology “extremely improbable” in FAR 25.1309 translates to an
average probability per ﬂight hour for catastrophic failure conditions of 10−9,
and “improbable” failure conditions are those having a probability on the or-
der of 10−5 or less per ﬂight hour (but greater than 10−9). The development
of a V&V process for demonstration of compliance to FAR/JAR 25.1309 is
extremely challenging for complex integrated systems designed for operation
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under oﬀ-nominal conditions, such as the AIRSAFE System concept of Fig. 2.
In fact, the V&V problem for these systems poses a key technology barrier
to their implementation and transition into the ﬂeet. There are currently no
comprehensive V&V processes for certifying advanced safety-critical control
systems, commercial or military, for eﬀective operation under oﬀ-nominal con-
ditions, or even for adaptive and potentially non-deterministic systems. The
following subsections discuss V&V problem complexity and key technical chal-
lenges for the AIRSAFE future system concept, V&V process requirements
for meeting those challenges, and a research approach being taken at NASA
to address V&V of future safety-critical systems.
2.1 V&V Problem Complexity and Technical Challenges
V&V of safety-critical integrated systems operating under oﬀ-nominal condi-
tions can be thought of and analyzed as a complex multidimensional problem
[5]. V&V problem complexity can be discussed in terms of system complexity,
operational complexity, and V&V process complexity.
System complexity arises from integrating vehicle health management
functions, resilient control functions, ﬂight safety assessment and prediction
functions, and crew interface and variable autonomy functions. Each of these
functions is characterized by algorithmic diversity that must be addressed in
the V&V process. Vehicle health management involves diagnostic and prog-
nostic algorithms that utilize stochastic decision-based reasoning and exten-
sive information processing and data fusion. Resilient control functions can in-
volve adaptive control algorithms that utilize time-varying parameters and/or
hybrid system switching. Flight safety management may involve diagnostic
and prognostic reasoning algorithms as well as control theoretic algorithms.
Crew interface functions involve displays that are human-factor-based and re-
quire information processing, and variable autonomy will require assessment
and reasoning algorithms. Onboard modeling functions will involve system
identiﬁcation algorithms and databases. All four core functions are software
based and will involve various levels of logic and discrete mathematics-based
abstractions and combinations. Subsystem integration will also involve signif-
icant software and possible hardware complexity.
The second aspect of V&V complexity arises from operational complexity.
Normal operating conditions of the future may extend beyond current-day op-
erational limits. Moreover, safe operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions that
could lead to LOC events will be a focus of the system design. In particular, op-
eration under abnormal ﬂight conditions, external hazards and disturbances,
adverse onboard conditions, and key combinations of these conditions will be
a major part of the operational complexity required for future safety-critical
systems. Future air transportation systems [6] must also be considered under
operational complexity, such as requirements for dense all-weather operations,
self separation of aircraft, and mixed capabilities of aircraft operating in the
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same airspace, including current and future vehicle conﬁgurations as well as
piloted and autonomous vehicles.
The third aspect of V&V complexity pertains to the V&V process itself.
A wide variety of analytical methods will be needed to evaluate stability and
performance of various and dissimilar system functions, robustness to ad-
verse and abnormal conditions, and reliability under errors, faults, failures,
and damage. Simulation methods will require the development of high-ﬁdelity
models that characterize oﬀ-nominal conditions and their multidisciplinary
eﬀects on the vehicle. The capability for multidisciplinary subsystem inte-
gration must also be available in a simulation environment, as well as the
inclusion of pilot-in-the-loop eﬀects. Simulation capability must range from
desk-top batch operation to hardware/pilot-in-the-loop ﬁxed/motion-based
evaluations. Experimental test capability must include ground and ﬂight test-
ing of hardware/software systems, allow for multidisciplinary subsystem in-
tegration, and enable realistic emulation of oﬀ-nominal conditions. The V&V
process must itself be assessed for its predictive capability to eﬀectively infer
safe system operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions associated with aircraft
LOC events that cannot be fully replicated during V&V. The V&V process
assessment must be able to quantify a level of conﬁdence in this inference.
Operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions over a wide envelope of ﬂight con-
ditions results in a very large operational space with multidisciplinary coupled
eﬀects. Due to the huge operational space, there are too many conditions to
fully analyze, simulate, and test. While there are numerous technical chal-
lenges associated with this problem, some key technical challenges are sum-
marized below.
• Development and Validation of Physics-Based Oﬀ-Nominal Conditions and Ef-
fects Models
– Requires modeling of
 adverse onboard conditions (e.g., faults, failures, damage)
 abnormal ﬂight conditions (e.g., unusual attitudes, stall, stall/departure,
other vehicle upset conditions)
 external hazards and disturbances (e.g., icing, wind shear, wake vortices,
turbulence)
 worst-case combinations, as determined from LOC Accident/Incident
data
– Requires data and/or experimental methods for oﬀ-nominal conditions,
which may not be available or easily obtained
– Can involve multidisciplinary coupled eﬀects
– Cannot fully replicate in-ﬂight LOC environment
• V&V of Adaptive Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Control Algorithms Operating
under Oﬀ-Nominal Conditions
– Involves a variety of nonlinear mathematical constructs (e.g., inference en-
gines, probabilistic methods, physics-based, neural networks, artiﬁcial intel-
ligence, etc.)
– May involve onboard adaptation that may result in stochastic system behav-
ior
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– Involves fusion and reasoning algorithms for sensor data, information pro-
cessing, and decisions
– Requires methods for establishing probabilities of
 false alarms and missed detections
 incorrect identiﬁcations and decisions
 loss of stability, recoverability, and control
– Requires methods and metrics for establishing oﬀ-nominal condition cover-
age, reliability, and accuracy for diverse algorithms and multiple objectives
– Requires integrated multi-disciplinary system assessment methods
 performance assessment
 error propagation and eﬀects assessment
 inter-operability eﬀectiveness assessment
• System Veriﬁcation and Safety Assurance
– Involves large-scale complex interconnected software systems
– Involves potentially fault tolerant and reconﬁgurable hardware
– May involve adaptive and reasoning algorithms with stochastic behavior
– Requires veriﬁcation methods for a complex system of systems
• V&V Predictive Capability Assessment
– Requires methods to demonstrate compliance to certiﬁcation standards for
an extensive set of oﬀ-nominal conditions and their combinations that cannot
be fully replicated
– Requires methods for determining and quantifying level of conﬁdence in V&V
process and results for demonstrating compliance
These technical challenges can be utilized in deﬁning V&V process require-
ments, as presented in Sect. 2.2.
2.2 V&V Process Requirements
In carrying out V&V of complex integrated safety-critical systems operating
under oﬀ-nominal conditions, it is necessary to expose system weaknesses and
vulnerabilities, and to be able to identify safe and unsafe operational condi-
tions, regions, and their boundaries. This is a key point. It is not suﬃcient,
for example, to demonstrate that a system appears to work in a few selected
ﬂight regimes or under a small subset of oﬀ-nominal conditions. In fact, it is
necessary to deﬁne a comprehensive integrated V&V process for these sys-
tems, and to utilize this process as a research framework to identify gaps in
current V&V capabilities. Moreover, it is critical to deﬁne a V&V process that
eﬀectively and eﬃciently utilizes analysis, simulation, and experimental test-
ing to assist in exposing system deﬁciencies and limitations over a very large
operational space. The V&V process must clearly demonstrate compliance to
certiﬁcation speciﬁcations, such as FAR/JAR 25.1309, and quantify a level of
conﬁdence in this compliance.
Key components of the V&V process include algorithm validation, system
veriﬁcation, and V&V predictive capability assessment. Each of these V&V
components requires the development of methods, tools, and testbeds to per-
form analysis, simulation/ground testing, and ﬂight testing. Moreover, each
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method, tool, and testbed must be developed to assess system operation un-
der oﬀ-nominal conditions associated with aircraft LOC accidents in order
to reduce or prevent them in the future. V&V metrics must be deﬁned for
the diverse set of algorithms associated with the subsystems and integrated
system, and new methods, tools, and testbeds developed as needed to assess
these metrics. Based on an analysis of the V&V problem, the V&V process
requirements for future systems designed for operation under oﬀ-nominal con-
ditions, such as the AIRSAFE System concept, can be deﬁned as depicted in
Fig. 3. This ﬁgure shows V&V process components, methods, and some ex-
ample algorithm validation metrics that are required for AIRSAFE subsystem
and integrated system technologies. The core V&V methods of analysis, sim-
ulation/ground testing, and ﬂight testing are applicable to each of the core
V&V components and take on diﬀerent meanings for each. Metrics must be
developed for assessment of each core component using the appropriate meth-
ods. Although Fig. 3 shows some example metrics for algorithm validation,
and illustrates that these are dependent on the algorithm type, metrics are
needed for each core V&V component.
System validation is a conﬁrmation that the algorithms are performing
the intended function under all possible operating conditions. Validation is
not merely a demonstration that the system works under the design condition
and selected test conditions, but a comprehensive process that involves analyt-
ical, simulation/ground testing, and ﬂight testing. The validation subprocess
must be capable of identifying potentially problematic regions of operation,
and their boundaries, and exposing system limitations - particularly for op-
eration under oﬀ-nominal conditions. Figure 3 presents some of the methods
and metrics needed for the analysis, simulation/ground testing, and ﬂight
testing of algorithms associated with AIRSAFE System technologies. New
methods, tools, testbeds, and metrics must be established for algorithms that
cannot be thoroughly evaluated using existing methods. For example, adap-
tive control systems may require new methods and metrics for their eﬀective
analysis. Moreover, methods and metrics may vary depending on the algo-
rithm being considered. For example, stability of detection and prediction al-
gorithms may imply convergence rate and accuracy rather than the traditional
control-theoretic meaning of stability. Performance of diagnostic and prognos-
tic algorithms may be characterized by probabilities associated with correct
detection and diagnosis of system faults or failures, whereas performance of
control systems may be characterized by tracking capability or evaluation of
some other control objective. Robustness for all algorithms must be evalu-
ated relative to uncertainties, including parameter variations and unmodeled
system dynamics, and disturbances, including signal and system noise and
turbulence. Coverage of oﬀ-nominal conditions must also be clearly deﬁned
and evaluated for eﬀectiveness in dealing with these conditions. Examples of
reliability metrics are given in the ﬁgure for detection/prediction and control
theoretic algorithms. Crew interface and variable autonomy algorithms must
be evaluated for handling qualities and interface eﬀectiveness, and aircraft-
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Fig. 3. V&V Process Requirements for the AIRSAFE System Concept
pilot coupling (APC), or pilot-induced oscillation (PIO), susceptibility under
oﬀ-nominal conditions. Moreover, real-time partitioning eﬀectiveness between
the human and automation must be evaluated under oﬀ-nominal and emer-
gency conditions. Simulation and ground testing includes traditional batch,
real-time, piloted, and hardware-in-the-loop methods, as well as a linked lab
capability for the integration and evaluation of multidisciplinary technologies.
Flight testing includes traditional full-scale testing to evaluate pilot/system
interactions, as well as sub-scale testing to evaluate algorithm eﬀectiveness
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and dynamics models under oﬀ-nominal conditions that are too risky for full-
scale testing.
Veriﬁcation of the system is a conﬁrmation that the validated algorithms
have been correctly implemented in software and hardware. This is also a non-
trivial task. Formal methods are utilized for analytically verifying with proofs
that the system requirements are fully deﬁned and met by the implementation.
Fault-tree and safety case analyses of the system implementation must also be
performed. Testing of code is performed at various levels of system build-up,
including evaluation of the code on representative or actual hardware to be
ﬁelded. Flight testing also requires the use of representative avionics hardware
systems and ﬂight environments under nominal and oﬀ-nominal conditions.
Although none are given in Fig. 3, veriﬁcation metrics must be clearly deﬁned
and evaluated.
V&V predictive capability assessment is an evaluation of the validity and
a level of conﬁdence that can be placed in the V&V process and its results
for operation under nominal and oﬀ-nominal conditions. The need for this
evaluation arises from the inability to fully evaluate these technologies under
actual LOC conditions. A detailed disclosure is required of model, simula-
tion, and emulation validity for the oﬀ-nominal conditions being considered
in the V&V, as well as interactions that have been neglected and assumptions
that have been made during design. Cross-correlations should be utilized be-
tween analytical, simulation and ground test, and ﬂight test results in order
to corroborate the results and promote eﬃciency in covering the very large
space of operational and oﬀ-nominal conditions being evaluated. The level
of conﬁdence in the V&V process and results must be established for sub-
system technologies as well as the fully integrated system. This includes an
evaluation of error propagation eﬀects across subsystems, and an evaluation of
integrated system eﬀectiveness in mitigating oﬀ-nominal conditions. Metrics
for performing this evaluation are also needed.
2.3 Research Approach
An approach taken at NASA for addressing V&V has been in the development
of metrics, methods, software tools, and testbeds that facilitate the evaluation
of safety-critical systems operating under oﬀ-nominal conditions. A high-level
V&V concept was developed which integrates analytical, simulation, and ex-
perimental methods. Analytical methods must be developed, with theoretical
extensions where needed, as well as user-friendly software tools to assess al-
gorithm stability, performance, robustness, and reliability under oﬀ-nominal
conditions. Simulation methods must be developed to facilitate Monte Carlo
analysis and piloted evaluations under oﬀ-nominal conditions. In addition, ad-
vanced high-ﬁdelity databases, models, and simulation enhancements must be
developed to characterize oﬀ-nominal conditions and their impacts on vehicle
dynamics and control. Experimental testbeds must be developed to facilitate
testing under oﬀ-nominal conditions in ground-based laboratory tests as well
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as in-ﬂight tests. The full integrated V&V process must also be demonstrated,
evaluated, and reﬁned using realistic LOC test scenarios, subsystems, and sys-
tems. The following sections present a V&V research framework developed at
NASA Langley and a brief summary of recent accomplishments in this re-
search.
3 V&V Process and Research Framework
Based on the V&V process requirements of Fig. 3, a detailed V&V process can
be developed for complex integrated resilient systems, such as the AIRSAFE
System concept of Fig. 2. A high-level overview of the integrated V&V process
is presented in Fig. 4. The shading of the blocks correlates to core AIRSAFE
subsystem functions depicted in Fig. 2 – that is, dark gray correlates to
resilient control functions, light gray represents health management functions,
and white is associated with crew interface functions. Multi-shaded boxes in
Fig. 4 represent evaluation of the associated integrated subsystem functions.
Analysis, simulation, and experimental V&V components are organized in
the V&V process of Fig. 4 moving from left to right, and system evaluation
becomes more highly integrated moving to the center and to the right. Also as
indicated in Fig. 4, results from the V&V process are utilized as an iterative
process for reﬁning the algorithm design of each subsystem. The remainder
of this section will present a more detailed description of the control-related
components of the V&V process, including methods and interfaces. This is
depicted in Fig. 4 by the dotted box around the lower two rows of the process.
Reference [5] provides a detailed description of the entire process.
A set of recommended V&V methods for resilient control system functions
is presented in Figs. 5 and 6, which depict analysis and simulation methods
and simulation and experimental methods, respectively. For process continu-
ity, the right-most blocks of Fig. 5 are repeated as the left-most blocks of
Fig. 6. The methods listed in each block include those that are currently well
understood and available as software tools, as well as some that are in need of
further research. Moreover, additional methods can be identiﬁed and added
to each block. In this way, new methods and tools can be identiﬁed.
The “Stability and Performance Analysis” block in the lower left of Fig. 5
includes standard stability and performance linear analysis methods, includ-
ing: eigenvalue and eigenvector analysis, transient and steady-state response,
and controllability/observability analysis. These methods are well understood
for standard linear time-invariant systems, but are not as well understood
for hybrid and adaptive systems. Failure and damage coverage must also be
considered relative to stability and performance implications.
The “Robustness Analysis” block includes standard μ-Analysis methods
(see Chap. ??) as well as nonlinear extensions (see Chap. ??) for analyzing
stability and performance robustness to uncertainties. Uncertainty modeling
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Fig. 4. V&V Process Overview
methods that generate a Linear Fractional Representation (LFR) of the uncer-
tain system must be utilized for characterizing linear and nonlinear parameter
variations (see Chaps. ?? – ??) and unmodeled dynamics. Robustness meth-
ods that enable the evaluation of hybrid systems switching eﬀects, adaptive
systems, stochastic uncertainties, and time-delay eﬀects must also be consid-
ered, as well as robustness and worst case analysis for fault/failure/damage
conditions and external disturbances.
The “Nonlinear Analysis” block of Fig. 5 includes bifurcation analysis of
nonlinear dynamic and controlled systems, controllability and observability
in a nonlinear sense, such as degree of controllability and observability as a
function of the changing parameters, and safe set and recoverability analysis.
Safe set and recoverability analysis enables the determination of safe oper-
ating regions within which recovery to stable trim points can be achieved,
as well as the identiﬁcation of boundaries to unsafe regions from which re-
covery may not be guaranteed or even possible. Nonlinear analysis of hybrid
and adaptive systems, fault and failure eﬀects, and achievable dynamics of
constrained or impaired vehicles must also be considered. A method for an-
alytically determining the Probability of LOC in a nonlinear sense must also
be developed.
These analysis methods must then be applied to the integrated health
management system, including failure detection and identiﬁcation functions
for critical control components, and resilient control system, including fail-
ure mitigation functions, as indicated by the “Integrated System Linear and
Nonlinear Analysis” block.
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Fig. 6. V&V Process for Resilient Control Functions – Simulation and Experi-
mental Methods
16 Christine M. Belcastro
The “Flying Qualities Analysis” block evaluates resilient control system
eﬀectiveness relative to a pilot being in the loop, and may integrate pilot mod-
els and/or crew interface functions. This analysis includes methods to assess
susceptibility to PIO, impact of inappropriate pilot inputs, handling qualities
under oﬀ-nominal conditions, eﬀectiveness of variable autonomy partitioning
between automatic control resilience functions and human-involved control,
eﬀectiveness of trajectory generation and management under vehicle impair-
ment or damage, and integrated guidance and control eﬀectiveness under oﬀ-
nominal conditions.
Nonlinear simulation evaluations are performed to assess: the eﬀective-
ness of the detection and mitigation algorithms and their integration; the
probability and impact of false alarms, missed detections, incorrect identi-
ﬁcations, and incorrect decisions; failure/damage coverage and propagation
eﬀects; achievable dynamics under vehicle failures or damage; and time de-
lay eﬀects associated with failure detection, identiﬁcation, and mitigation.
Guided Monte Carlo studies, guided by analysis results to further explore
potentially problematic operational regions, can be utilized to assess these
and other reliability metrics, robustness under uncertainties, and worst-case
combinations of ﬂight and impairment conditions. Nonlinear simulations are
used in evaluating the vehicle health management and resilient control sub-
systems individually and in combination. The crew interface subsystem is
assessed in piloted simulation evaluations individually and as part of the inte-
grated system to evaluate: crew interface eﬀectiveness in improving situational
awareness under oﬀ-nominal conditions; mitigation and recovery eﬀectiveness,
including variable levels of autonomy; handling qualities under oﬀ-nominal
conditions, using Cooper-Harper metrics and extensions; variable autonomy
interface eﬀectiveness; and ﬂight/trajectory management under oﬀ-nominal
and emergency conditions.
Fig. 6 shows the progression to subsystem and integrated system eval-
uations that involve the software/hardware implementations. Formal veri-
ﬁcation and safety case analysis methods are utilized to assess system re-
quirements and speciﬁcations, implementation integrity of adaptive and pre-
dictive/reasoning systems under oﬀ-nominal conditions, hybrid switching
logic, and the variable autonomy interface. Various levels of system integra-
tion and implementation are evaluated through laboratory tests and ﬂight
tests, using both full-scale and sub-scale vehicles. Ground and ﬂight test
methods are utilized to assess system integration, software implementation,
fault/failure/damage mitigation eﬀectiveness, and upset recovery eﬀectiveness
under oﬀ-nominal conditions throughout and beyond the normal ﬂight enve-
lope. Robustness to uncertainties, reliability and coverage, variable autonomy
interface eﬀectiveness, and impacts of inappropriate crew responses are also
assessed. Sub-scale vehicle ﬂight tests are utilized for high-risk conditions that
would not be feasible in a manned vehicle, and full-scale ﬂight tests are per-
formed to evaluate the crew/vehicle interfaces (CVI) in ﬂight while using the
appropriate timescale.
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The V&V process depicted in Figs. 5 and 6 is integrated across the various
methods, with information being exchanged between each block. Information
exchange is indicated with double-headed arrows. Reference [5] provides a
detailed description of information exchange throughout the process. As an
example, consider a subset of the process shown in Fig. 5 and depicted below
in Fig. 7.
   Integrated Resilient Control (IRC) Algorithms Design
Nonlinear Simulaon Evaluaon
- Monte Carlo Reliability Studies
- Probability / Impact of Incorrect Decisions
- Failure/Damage Coverage & Propagaon Eﬀects
- Achievable Dynamics under Vehicle Constraints
- Probability of Loss of Control
- Guided Monte Carlo Robustness & Worst
  Case Studies
- Time Delay Eﬀects and Impacts
...
Stability & Performance 
Analysis
- Transient & Steady-State
  Response
- Controllability / 
  Observability 
- Hybrid Systems 
- Failure/Damage Coverage
...
Robustness Analysis
- Parameter Variaons (L&N)
- Unmodeled Dynamics
- Hybrid Systems Switching
- Faults/Failures/Damage
- External Disturbances
- Worst Case Analysis
- Time-Delay Eﬀects
...
Nonlinear Analysis
- Bifurcaon
- Controllability / 
  Observability
- Safe Set / Recoverability
- Hybrid Systems
- Faults/Failures Eﬀects
- Prob. of Loss of Control
- Achievable Dynamics &
  Feasible Trajectories
  under Constraints
...
Fig. 7. V&V Subprocess for Resilient Control Functions – Analysis and Simulation
Methods
This ﬁgure contains analysis and simulation methods that are applied to
the resilient control functions. To illustrate information exchange between
subprocess components, consider a subset of these methods as presented in
Fig. 8.
Starting with the lower left block of Fig. 8, failure/damage scenarios are
evaluated in the “Stability and Performance Analysis” block based on the
failure and damage proﬁles being mitigated in the resilient control design.
The stability and performance analysis results deﬁne the eﬀective coverage of
these failure/damage scenarios. This information can be provided for use in
the “Robustness Analysis” block to generate parametric and non-parametric
uncertainty models, and for performing a worst case analysis. Using robust-
ness analysis techniques, failure/damage coverage margins can be generated
as well as worst case failure, damage, and uncertainty combinations. These
results can be utilized by the nonlinear analysis tools, such as bifurcation,
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Fig. 8. Example V&V Subprocess Interfaces for Resilient Control Functions –
Analysis and Simulation Methods
safe set and recoverability, and failure eﬀect analyses, to identify potentially
problematic nonlinear operating regions. The nonlinear analysis results can
be utilized in re-evaluating robustness in these regions. Analysis results re-
lated to stability and performance, such as failure/damage coverage predic-
tions, robustness, including uncertainties, worst case scenarios, and predicted
margins, and nonlinear properties, such as potentially problematic operating
conditions, are utilized, corroborated, or disputed during nonlinear simulation
evaluations. Simulation results are then utilized by the analysis components
during re-evaluation. The analysis and simulation results are also utilized as
part of an iterative design process. Each evaluation method provides a basis
for improved system design, as depicted in Fig. 8. The subsequent analysis
and simulation results might then be utilized to generate test scenarios for use
in piloted simulation evaluations (not shown in Fig. 8). It is conjectured that
the use of analytical, simulation, and experimental results in a coordinated
manner will provide a means to eﬀectively and eﬃciently identify problematic
ﬂight conditions, oﬀ-nominal conditions, uncertainties, and combinations of
these without having to perform exhaustive testing.
Recent NASA research that pertains to the V&V process thus described
is brieﬂy summarized and referenced in Sect. 4.
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4 V&V Research Status and Recent Accomplishments
Signiﬁcant resources and eﬀort have been invested by NASA in addressing
the V&V of future advanced safety-critical systems. For the last decade, this
work has largely been planned and funded by the system research projects fo-
cused on vehicle health management, ﬂight-critical system design, and resilient
control technology development under the NASA Aviation Safety Program
(AvSP). This research has resulted in the development of analytical methods
and software tools, simulation-based methods, and experimental testbeds for
the validation of safety-critical systems operating under oﬀ-nominal condi-
tions related to aircraft loss of control [7, 8]. These results are summarized
in [9]. Software veriﬁcation methods and tools were also developed under this
research eﬀort, and a new eﬀort under the AvSP is currently being planned
to focus on the V&V of software-intensive systems [10]. This new eﬀort will
develop V&V methods that can be applied to the Next Generation Air Trans-
portation System.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Aircraft loss of control is a signiﬁcant contributor to accidents and fatalities,
resulting in the highest number of fatalities among the worldwide commer-
cial jet ﬂeet. It is also the most complex accident category, resulting from
numerous causal and contributing factors that occur individually or more
often combine to result in a loss of control accident or incident. These fac-
tors are oﬀ-nominal conditions that occur onboard the aircraft, as external
disturbances, or as abnormal ﬂight conditions. To address aircraft loss of
control, NASA is developing onboard systems technologies to: prevent and
detect faults, failures, and damage through the development of vehicle health
management technologies; provide improved situational awareness to the crew
through the development of advanced ﬂight deck technologies; and to provide
the capability to mitigate oﬀ-nominal conditions through the development of
resilient aircraft control technologies. A future technology concept, called the
AIRSAFE System, for integrating these technologies and providing onboard
ﬂight safety assurance is envisioned. These technologies are being developed
for safety-critical operation under oﬀ-nominal conditions.
The V&V of safety-critical systems operating under oﬀ-nominal conditions
poses signiﬁcant technical challenges. This chapter has provided an analysis
of this V&V problem, and has described a research approach being taken
at NASA to address it. High-level V&V process requirements were deﬁned,
which integrate analytical, simulation, and experimental methods, software
tools, and testbeds. A detailed V&V process was deﬁned for application to
the AIRSAFE System concept, and a detailed description was provided of
the methods and some example interfaces involved in the controls-related
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components. Research progress at NASA in the development of analytical,
simulation, and experimental methods was brieﬂy discussed and referenced.
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Table 2. Abbreviations and acronyms
ADRM Aerodrome
AIRSAFE Aviation Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance and Failsafe Enhancement
AMAN Abrupt Maneuver
ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
ATM Air Traﬃc Management
AvSP Aviation Safety Program
CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CFIT Controlled Flight Into or Toward Terrain
CVI Crew/Vehicle Interface
EVAC Evacuation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
F-NI Fire/Smoke (Non-Impact)
F-POST Fire/Smoke (Post-Impact)
GCOL Ground Collision
HW Hardware
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICE Icing
IRC Integrated Resilient Control
IVHM Integrated Vehicle Health Management
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities
LFR Linear Fractional Representation
LOC loss of control
LOC-G Loss of Control - Ground
LOC-I Loss of Control - In ﬂight
LALT Low Altitude Operations
L&N Linear and Nonlinear
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
MAC Midair/Near Midair Collision
OTHR Other
PIO Pilot-Induced Oscillation
RAMP Ground Handling
RC Resilient Control
RE Runway Excursion
RI-A Runway Incursion - Animal
RI-VAP Runway Incursion - Vehicle, Aircraft or Person
SEC Security
SCF-NP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Power Plant)
SCF-PP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Power Plant)
SW Software
TURB Turbulence Encounter
USOS Undershoot/Overshoot
UNK Unknown or Undetermined
VHM Vehicle Health Management
V&V Validation and Veriﬁcation
WSTRW Wind Shear or Thunderstorm
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